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 Communities and Water Markets:  
A Review of the Model Water Transfer Act 
Santos Gomez and Penn Loh* 
I. Introduction
Water issues have emerged as some of the most intractable of 
contemporary policy issues, as regions around the world try to balance rapid 
increases in demand with fixed, and sometimes declining, quantities of fresh 
water. California, with the eighth largest economy in the world, a semi-arid 
climate, and a growing population, is facing these issues. Demand for fresh 
water continues to increase as supply remains relatively fixed due to the 
rising economic and environmental costs of new infrastructure.1 Conflicts 
over water continue to intensify. This dilemma has forced water planners to 
consider the reallocation of existing supplies among competing and 
sometimes conflicting uses. 
* Santos Gomez is a Senior Research Associate at the Pacific Institute for
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security in Oakland, California, and the 
Director of the Community Strategies for Sustainability and Justice. Penn Loh is the 
Development and Research Director at Alternatives for Community and Environment 
in Boston, Massachusetts. The research for this project was supported by the 
Community Alliance with Family Farmers Foundation, the San Francisco Foundation, 
the Gap Foundation, and the University of California Sustainable Agriculture 
Research and Education program. We would like to thank Anna Steding and Arlene 
Wong for their thoughtful review and comments. 
1. While demands for water continue to increase, the traditional response of
developing new supplies is no longer a feasible option. Several factors have 
contributed to this new reality. First, high project costs and declining public 
resources have led to fewer projects being built. Second, environmental legislation 
such as the National Wilde and Scenic Rivers Act and the Endangered Species Act 
have limited the number of cost-effective sites. Third, there has been voter resistance 
to pay for expensive new water projects as exemplified by the decisive rejection of 
the Peripheral Canal bound measure in 1982. Fourth, recent public trust court 
decisions make it increasingly difficult to construct new water projects. See e.g. ,Brian 
E. Gray, The Shape of Things to Come: A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 WEST-
NORTHWEST 23 (1996); PENN LOH & SANTOS V. GOMEZ, WATER TRANSFERS IN CALIFORNIA: A
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND JUSTICE (1996).
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Surprisingly, there seems to be growing agreement among economists, 
environmentalists, urban water agencies and others that water markets can 
and should help solve this problem. Economists have shown that market 
transfers, in theory, could make water allocation more economically 
efficient.2 Water would be voluntarily traded from lower to higher economic 
value uses—primarily from agriculture to the urban sector. 
Environmentalists endorse the idea because it has the potential to alleviate 
the need for new, expensive, and environmentally damaging water supply 
projects. Further, many believe that water transfers will provide an 
opportunity for environmental interests to purchase water for environmental 
uses.3 Urban water interests hope that water markets will provide new 
supplies of water more cheaply than will building new infrastructure.4 Some 
farmers view water transfers as an opportunity to improve farm profitability.5 
Markets, however, "are not an end in and of themselves but a means to 
the end of a water allocation process that serves both private and public 
interests."6 Despite more than 15 years of policy discussions and initiatives 
2. See generally BONNIE SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); T.L. ANDERSON, 
WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1983); BAY AREA ECONOMIC FORUM (hereinafter BAEF), USING WATER BETTER: A MARKET-
BASED APPROACH TO CALIFORNIA'S WATER CRISIS (1991); RICHARD W. WAHL, WATER 
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS (1993) (Reason 
Foundation, Policy Study No. 162, 1993); Charles H. Howe, Dennis R. Schurmeier, 
and W. Douglas Shaw Jr., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for Water 
Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439 (1986); H.J. Vaux Jr. and Richard E. Howitt, 
Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RES. 
785 (1994). 
3. NATIONAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE [HEREINAFTER NHI], NHI PROPOSAL ON
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS TO FACILITATE WATER TRANSFERS (1995); ROBERT STAVINS AND ZACH 
WILLEY, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER (1993); ZACH WILLEY, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN CALIFORNIA'S WEATHER SYSTEM (1985); Zach 
Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget: The Case of Markets, Water, and Environment 
[hereinafter Behind Schedule and Over Budget], 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 391 (1992). 
4. See e.g., METRO. WATER DIST. OF S. CAL. [hereinafter MWD], INTEGRATED 
RESOURCE PLAN (Phase 1 Report, Final Draft, 1994). 
5. See generally, Harold O. Carter and Henry J. Vaux Jr., Third-Party Effects: The
Research Challenge,  in SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 44 
(Harold O. Carter, et al. eds., 1994). See also IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER
REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY STUDY (1996). and PENN LOH AND ANNA STEDING, THE
PALO VERDE TEST LAND FALLOWING PROJECT: A MODEL FOR FUTURE CALIFORNIA WATER
TRANSFERS? (1996). 
6. See e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL COMM. ON W. WATER MGMT. [hereinafter NRC],
WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, ENVIRONMENT (1992). 
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aimed at creating a long-term, state-wide market for water transfers, there 
has been a lack of democratic discussion over public values in water and an 
excessive focus on economic efficiency of allocation. The proposed Model 
Water Transfer Act for California (Model Act)—the latest in a series of recent 
proposals to reform the state laws governing market-based water 
reallocation and water rights in California—does little to remedy these 
deficiencies. Water in California is too important to economic prosperity, 
environmental quality, and social well-being to be left entirely to market 
reallocation. Water marketing reforms, as currently proposed, are unlikely to 
support sustainability and equity as long as large segments of the 
population, especially the poor and people of color, are excluded from the 
debate. 
This paper reviews the proposed Model Act with respect to community 
impacts and suggests alternative solutions. It begins by reviewing the 
evolution of water policy in California (Section II). Specifically, it explains 
why the narrow market model usually proposed—and on which the Model 
Act is premised—is not the proper institutional foundation for water 
reallocation. Water is a free-flowing and shared resource that is not easily 
turned into a private commodity. Furthermore, the market conflicts with 
other public goals such as protecting rural communities, ensuring equity and 
fairness, and promoting sustainability. 
Then, in Section III, this paper reviews and critiques the Model Act, 
with a special focus on the community and third-party impact provisions. 
While the Model Act would lower some of the legal hurdles to water transfer, 
and thereby create greater incentives for them, it fails to adequately protect 
legitimate community and third-party interests. 
This paper concludes that without making water allocation fairer and 
more sustainable, water markets are unlikely to be consistent with public 
ends and may not develop at all. Indeed, markets for water have yet to 
emerge in California despite the fact that the state has passed more 
legislation to encourage water marketing in the last decade than any other 
state.7 On the other hand, if water transfer policies are built on a foundation 
of a clearly defined public interest and a fair democratic decision making 
process, then voluntary trades of water could contribute to a more 
sustainable and equitable water future for the state. 
II. The Market Reform Strategy: A Historical Context
The desire to use the market institution to allocate water 
resources throughout the West is quite appealing at first 
glance. Indeed, it has been the failure to markets price 
7. See e.g., Richard W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water in California, 1 WEST-
NORTHWEST 49 (1994). 
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water which has led to an exaggerated notion of the 
seriousness of the 'scarcity' problem in the first place. 
However, it is also important to look beyond the 
theoretically desirable properties of a market allocation to 
see if, in fact, an efficient solution will obtain.8 
[T]he common inclination [is to] think of [water] transfers
in a mode of a contract, with two parties only—a buyer and
a seller. I believe that a more appropriate model would be a
diplomatic negotiation with a number of parties, each with
important and legitimate interests that need to be
accommodated, but without clearly defined rights. The
future of water transfers will be jeopardized unless something
like that broader and more inclusive model is embraced.9
Water transfers are not new, and have, in fact, been part of California's 
water history since 1859 when the California Supreme Court held that water 
could be "transferred like other property."10 Three years later, however, the 
court recognized the rights of other water users when it ruled that the 
transfer of water or water rights "must not be to the prejudice of the rights of 
others."11 This principle of "third-party protection" remains intact today12 and 
is viewed by many as the principal limitation on transfers of water in 
California. 
More recently, Hirschleifer, DeHaven, and Milliman were among the 
first to promote the view that water was not special and should be treated 
like any other commodity in its allocation.13 Economists suggested that a 
market could allow water to flow from lower value to higher value uses.14 By 
8. Victor Brajer & Wade E. Martin, Allocating a 'Scarce' Resource, Water in the West:
More Market-Like Incentives Can Extend Supply, But Constraints Demand Equitably Policies, 48 
AM. J. ECON, & SOC'Y 268 (1989). 
9. Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of
Water,  1 WEST-NORTHWEST 13 (1994). 
10. See McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220
(1859). 
11. See Butte T.M. v. Morgan, 19 Cal. 609 (1862). It is important to recognize
that the "rights of others" as used in this case refers to other water rights holders and 
not the community or non-water rights holders third-parties. 
12. See CAL. WATER CODE section 1702, 1706 (West 1996).
13. See JACK HIRSCHLEIFER, ET AL., WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
POLICY (1960). 
14. See generally Clifford Lee, The Transfer of Water Rights in California: Background
and Issues (Governor's Comm. to Review Water Rights Law, Staff Paper No. 5, 1977); 
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the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, proponents of water marketing in California 
included the RAND Corporation and the Governor's Commission to Review 
California Water Rights Law. These proponents suggested that appropriate 
economic incentives were necessary to use water more efficiently and to 
encourage voluntary transfers.15 
During the 1980’s, economists, urban water agencies, 
environmentalists, and business interests began to focus on water 
marketing as the best way to reallocate the state's water to urban growth 
and environmental goals.16 Growing urban areas and businesses believed 
that water markets would provide new water supplies more cheaply than 
building new infrastructure. Some environmentalists supported water 
markets as a way to prevent the construction of more dams and to 
encourage more efficient practices and the purchase of water for 
environmental purposes. Market advocates hoped that subjecting allocation 
decisions to the economic calculus of the market would avoid the economic 
inefficiencies generate by the political system of allocation dominated by a 
few powerful interests. 
In the hopes of encouraging water marketing, reforms over the past 15 
years in California have established clearer property rights and removed 
some restrictions on voluntary sales of water.17 Yet there have been few 
CHARLES E. PHELPS ET AL., EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: WATER RIGHTS, WATER
DISTRICTS AND WATER TRANSFERS (1978). 
15. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW;
FINAL REPORT (4978); CHARLES E. PHELPS ET AL., EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: WATER
RIGHTS, WATER DISTRICTS AND WATER TRANSFERS (1978). 
16. See generally WILLEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN
CALIFORNIA'S WATER SYSTEM, supra note 3. See also MOHAMED EL-ASHRY AND DIANA C. 
GIBBONS, TROUBLED WATERS: NEW POLICIES GOR MANAGING WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST
(1986); MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR
WESTERN WATER (1990). 
17. See e.g., BRENT M. HADDAD, THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF EFFORTS TO
CREATE WATER MARKETS IN CALIFORNIA: WHY THE WELL IS STILL DRY (forthcoming 1996); 
Gary D. Weatherford, State and Federal Water Transfer Legislation, Address Before the 
BAEF Environmental and Water Law Section (July 26, 1996). In the early 1980s, the 
California Legislature enacted policies that made water transfers not simply an 
incidental feature of water policy, but vital to long-term water planning. The 
Legislature declared "that...efficient use of water requires certainty in the definition 
of property rights to the use of water and transferability of such rights." CAL. WATER
CODE section 109(a) (West 1996). The Legislature went on to say that it is "the 
established policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water 
rights where consistent with the public interest in the place of export and the place 
of import." Id. 
693 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
long-term inter-regional transfers and almost no market-like transfers in the 
state.18 This section describes why the pure market model is not the 
appropriate template for water reallocation policy. First, economic theory 
makes various assumptions about well-functioning markets that are not, and 
may never be, satisfied in the real world. Simply because a resource could 
theoretically be allocated more efficiently does not mean that a market will 
or should evolve.19 Second, the primary objective of markets—economic 
efficiency—can, and in the context of California water does, conflict with 
other important social values such as fairness in decision making, equitable 
access, and sustainability. Economic incentives can make the attainment 
of social goals easier and more efficient, but first these goals must be 
better defined. 
A. Water as a Commodity: The Theoretical Economic
Underpinning
Water marketing reforms have been supported by neoclassical 
economic theory. The "new resource economists" promoted the view that 
natural resources were best regulated by privatizing rights and creating 
markets for their allocation.20 Other economists were less outspoken, yet 
optimistic about the possibilities of market reforms. Vaux and Howitt, using 
an inter-regional trade model of water transfers in California, determined 
that market transfers would offset the need for new supplies such that only 
100,000 acre-feet of new capacity would be required by 2020.21 Such findings 
of potential benefits of market allocation have bolstered reforms aimed at 
instituting a private property regime for water. 
In an ideal water market, self-interested individuals hold secure titles 
that can be freely sold and transferred. When buyer and seller are given full 
information of the costs, benefits, and alternatives, trades occur only if the 
Other efforts designed to facilitate voluntary transfers included the right to 
transfer reclaimed water and emergency transfers. Id. sections 1010, 1435; the right to 
use the unused conveyance capacity of public agencies, id. sections 1810-14; and the 
creation of a drought water bank, id. sections 480-82. More recent efforts to facilitate 
water transfers include the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, sections 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992), and the Monterey Agreement. 
See e.g., IMPLEMENTATION IF THE MONTEREY AGREEMENT (May 1995) (Statement of 
Principles by the State Water Contractors and the State of California, Department of 
Water Resources for Potential Amendments to the State Water Supply Contracts). 
18. See LOH & GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 6-8.
19. See generally Peter S. Menell, Institutional Fantasylands; From Scientific
Management to Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489 (1992). 
20. See e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 2.
21. See Vaux and Howitt, supra note 2, at 789.
694 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
exchange benefits both. Thus, water allocation is determined by 
decentralized decisions by individuals rather than by a central regulator. 
Distribution of water is economically efficient because it flows to its highest 
economically values uses, thus maximizing the sum of all economic benefits 
received. True market allocation is distinguished from government use of 
economic incentives in that prices are set by the market and not by the 
government, as they are in a regulated water bank.22 
According to economic theory, an efficient, well-functioning market 
and its potential benefits can only be achieved under certain conditions.23 
These include that: 
1. Property rights must be clearly and completely specified,
exclusive, and transferable.
2. The infrastructure must exist for water to be transported from
seller to buyer.
3. 3.  Buyers and sellers must be fully informed about other buyers
and sellers, the water right, and the benefits and costs of the
trade and its alternatives.
4. The transfer must not impose costs on third parties (external costs).
5. Transaction costs must be minimal.
6. Buyers and sellers must be numerous enough so that no one
buyer or seller can influence price.
B. Feasibility of Market Conditions in California
The above conditions rarely hold in California. Active water markets in 
the Western U.S. only exist under unique institutional and geographic 
conditions that are not likely to be replicated broadly.24 In most regions, 
there are many practical complications in establishing a water market. In 
California, only some of the water rights are both quantified and secure 
enough to transfer. Although appropriative rights claimed before 1914 
should be quantified, they are only established through adjudication and 
therefore are easily shuffled around. Further, most groundwater rights 
remain unquantified.25 
22. See Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget, supra note 3, at 403.
23. See generally HADDAD, supra note 17; Brajer & Martin, supra note 8; Zachary
McCormick, Institutional Barriers to Water Marketing in the West, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 
953 (1994); Robert A. Young, Why Are There So Few Transactions Among Water Users, 68 
AMER. J. AG. ECON. 1143 (1986). 
24. See e.g., Ari M. Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural
Characteristics of an Active Water Market,  30 WATER RES. BULL. 971 (1994). 
25. Telephone interview with E. Anton, Chief Division of Water Rights,
California State Water Resources Control Board, (July 24, 1996). 
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According to Tarlock, California's "water rights do not function to 
allocate water, but as licenses to take until the taking is contested."26 
Clarifying a water right and determining the potential impacts of a transfer 
require expensive hydrologic studies of return flows and interactions with 
groundwater.27 Parties other than the buyer and seller, including other water 
rights holders, water recreationists, local communities and their economies, 
as well as the environment, could be significantly affected if a transfer 
changes the quantity or quality of water available at a certain place and 
time. Uncertain water rights, costly and uncertain information, and impacts 
on parties other than the buyer and seller all raise the costs of transactions. 
These costs include looking for parties with whom to trade, verifying the legal 
rights and physical characteristics of the water to be traded, negotiating price 
and other terms, and obtaining legal approval for the transaction.28 
Under these conditions, a long-term, inter-regional water market is 
likely to be small, as has been the case so far in California. Participation is 
limited primarily to those buyers and sellers connected to existing 
conveyance systems who have the resources to pay high transactions costs. 
Until recently, buyers have been dominated by one urban agency, the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. More recently, other 
urban water agencies, including San Diego County Water Authority and the 
East Bay Municipal Utility District, have entered the market. Potential sellers 
have been limited to those districts with reliable and secure rights: the three 
major irrigation districts using Colorado River supplies, the four original San 
Joaquin River exchange contractors, and Sacramento River water rights 
holders. So far, only one individual seller has publicly entered 
negotiations.29 Without numerous buyers and sellers, a water market would 
not be well-functioning nor efficient, and thus potential benefits would not 
be realized. Many potential buyers and sellers are not individuals but water 
districts that hold water rights. These organizations sometimes block trades, 
but often do so in order to protect their own viability and the interests of 
their members and to ensure local control.30 
26. A. Dan Tarlock, From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Abundance: The Legacy of
California Water Law and Politics, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 71 (1994). 
27. The Model Act does not address groundwater transfers per se, it only
addresses groundwater in conjunctive use with surface water transfers. As for pre-
1914 surface water transfers, the Model Act does not require SWRCB review of 
approval. 
28. See Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions, Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation,
72 AMER. J. AG. ECON. 1184 (1990). 
29. See e.g., J.A. Savage, The Selling of Water, 25 CAL. J. 39 (1994).
30. See Barton H. Thompson Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993). 
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Some of these barriers to markets could be overcome, albeit at some 
cost. Water rights could be more clearly defined and quantified. A simpler 
administrative process could be implemented for transfers. Formulas could 
be used to quantify and to compensate for community and third-party 
impacts. While the Model Act makes incremental progress in many of these 
areas, many of the market conditions listed above are unlikely to be satisfied 
because they stem from water's physical characteristics and its importance 
to community and individual well-being. Sax suggests that in each transfer 
there are numerous parties, "each with important and legitimate interests 
that need to be accommodated, but without clearly defined rights."31 
C. Desirability of Market Objectives: Is There More Than
Economic Efficiency?
A more important consideration than feasibility of markets is 
desirability. Even if markets are more efficient than other allocation 
institutions, the social values promoted by a market may conflict with other 
legitimate public goals. The market's main purpose is to promote 
economically efficient allocation; this is consistent with the values of 
individualism, self-sufficiency, and decentralized economic organization. 
Economic efficiency, however, is only a means to other social ends. 
Community values, equity and fairness, and sustainability are not just 
barriers to markets, they are also among the ends that allocation 
institutions should help achieve. 
Private water rights do not account for all the benefits of water that 
accrue to the broader community. "Unlike almost every other form of 
property, which we allow to be entirely privatized, water has always been 
viewed as something in which the community has a stake and which no one 
can fully own."32 Water districts in arid regions serve not simply to provide 
water but also to resolve conflicts and realize local participation and 
control.33 At the local level, existing water uses support the economy, tax 
base, environment, and recreational values of the communities.34 Local 
communities, such as Hispanic and Native American communities in the 
southwest and other rural communities, derive an important sense of 
cultural identity, of place, and of security from traditional water allocation 
31. See Sax, supra note 9, at 13.
32. Id.
33. See generally, ARTHUR MAASS & RAYMOND L. ANDERSON, . . . AND THE DESERT
SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT, GROWTH, AND JUSTICE IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS (1978). 
34. CAL. ACTION NETWORK [hereinafter CAN], CALIFORNIA WATER MARKETING POLICY:
TOWARD ACHIEVING A NET BENEFIT FOR ALL (1992); CAN. & CAL. ASS'N OF FAMILY FARMERS, 
SALES OF WATER IN CALIFORNIA: SOME THOUGHTS FROM AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES (1992). 
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systems.35  Even from the state perspective, certain rural cultures and 
environmental values are heritage resources that should be protected. In In 
re Application of Howard Sleeper,36 Judge Encinas reversed the approval by the 
New Mexico State Engineer of a water right transfer from an agricultural use 
to a ski resort. He ruled that the "unique cultural heritage" of Northern New 
Mexico should be preserved over the net economic benefits offered by the 
ski development.37 According to the court, these types of collective benefits 
are difficult to measure in market prices and therefore difficult to 
compensate for in transfers. Supporting the values of conflict resolution, 
community cohesiveness, and cultural heritage requires some measure of 
public control over allocation.38 
Purely economic markets are also objectionable if the goals are equity 
in distribution and fairness in the decision making process. Creating a 
system of private rights redistributes wealth. At the same time that rights 
holders gain more secure titles to water, other individuals and the 
communities that have benefited from the use of water in a particular place 
and manner become "third parties" and potentially lose their historical 
benefits if water is transferred without adequate protections. Of particular 
concern is the fact that transfers of water would disproportionately harm the 
poor since they have the fewest resources to adjust to economic changes 
caused by the loss of water.39 The poor and people of color are also the least 
likely to hold water rights and thus the least likely to benefit directly from 
water sales. Economic theory holds that a wide range of distributional 
outcomes are possible in a market, depending on the initial allocation of 
rights. It is unlikely that a market based on the present disparities in water 
rights and on the ability to adjust to economic changes will achieve an 
equitable outcome. Achieving a more equitable distribution of water is not 
an economic task, nor an afterthought to establishing a market; it is a 
political task that needs to be discussed before proceeding with new 
legislation or policy to create a water market. 
In an unregulated market system, water is allocated according to 
individual decisions to buy, sell, and use water. The public interest is 
defined as the sum total of private benefits. Water planning then becomes 
35. See e.g., F. LEE BROWN & HELEN M. INGRAM, WATER AND POVERTY IN THE
SOUTHWEST (1987). 
36. Case No. RA-84-53(C), Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, First Judicial
District (April 16,1985). 
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See generally BROWN & INGRAM, supra note 35; CAN, supra note 34; Sax, supra
note 9. 
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irrelevant and private "wants," not public "needs," dominate.40 Market 
reallocation, therefore, is not fair because water flows to those with the most 
resources. The rich have more of a "vote" in the marketplace and will 
determine how water will be used. By moving water to the highest-valued 
uses as measured in economic terms, the market will distribute water 
according to effective wants, not needs. Such a system will not support 
widely accepted social goals such as providing affordable access to 
adequate supplies of water for meeting basic human and environmental 
needs, or as keeping public institutions responsive and accountable to the 
public. As California's water needs change, driven by economic and 
demographic changes, democratic processes and fairness in decision 
making will increase in importance. Because water is so infused with public 
values, only democratic institutions that allow public debate over the 
common good can ensure fairness in allocation decisions. 
Finally, markets do not promote the long-term sustainability of the 
water resource. Markets do not ensure that ecological integrity is 
maintained for future generations. Short-term gains often outweigh 
preferences for future uses.  Prices do not reflect the full value of the 
services provided by ecosystems or the intrinsic value of pristine and 
undeveloped water courses. Even if water could be purchased for the 
environment, this water could not reach many of the wetlands and wildlife 
refuges that are not connected to the state's water system unless new 
infrastructure is built. 
Water is also implicated in the sustainability of the state as a whole. 
Ironically, market transfers of water from agricultural to municipal and 
industrial uses, while preventing new dams, could allow for more 
unsustainable growth in the state. Urban growth patterns have been led by 
land-owning and developer interests, who have pursued new water supplies 
not to meet existing needs but to facilitate unplanned growth and increase 
their own wealth.41 This growth-oriented water ethic has resulted in more 
than 110 approved or pending developments without identified long-term 
reliable water supplies.42 Many urban water managers still ascribe to this 
ethic and feel that it is their job to meet demands, not to control it.43 
40. See Victor Brajer, et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They
Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, NAT. RES. J. 489 (1989). 
41. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB & MARGARET FITZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER
AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1991); Richard A. Walker & Matthew J. 
Williams, Water from Power: Water Supply and Regional Growth in the Santa Clara Valley, 58 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 95 (1982). 
42. See E. BAY MUN. UTILITY DIST., LACK OF LONG-TERM RELIABLE WATER SUPPLIES (1995). 
43. See DAVID L. FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: IN SEARCH OF AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 2 (1991). 
699 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
In a market, large urban water agencies have the upper hand in 
negotiations in terms of information, staff, and willingness to pay for water. 
Thus, water marketing may result in more suburban sprawl at the expense of 
open space, farmland, and rural communities. According to a recent study 
by the American Farmland Trust, more than one million acres of farmland 
(60 percent of which is prime farmland) will be lost to urbanization in the 
Central Valley by the year 2040.44 Thompson notes that because many urban 
agencies do not use marginal cost pricing, the water transfer option can be a 
way for these agencies to avoid implementing politically sensitive 
conservation and pricing practices that could reduce demand at less overall 
cost.45 Recent evidence from urban water agencies—including the Goleta 
Water District and the East Bay Municipal Utility District—support this 
notion.46 
III. The Model Act: Inadequate Protections for Community and
Third-Party Impacts
As noted above, years of policy reform efforts and attempts to create a 
market for inter-regional long-term water rights in California have yielded 
few long-term, inter-regional, market-like transfers. Today, fresh attempts 
are being made to create a water market. The Model Water Transfer Act for 
California is the latest proposal to reform the state laws governing the 
market transfer of water and water rights in California.47 Sponsored by the 
California Business Roundtable, the California Chamber of Commerce, the 
California Farm Bureau Federation, the California Manufacturers 
Association, and authored by Hastings College of the Law Professor Brian E. 
Gray, the Model Act reflects the view that voluntary water transfers can help 
reallocate the available water supply to the benefit of all Californians.48 
44. AM. FARMLAND TRUST, ALTERNATIVES FOR FUTURE URBAN GROWTH IN CALIFORNIA'S 
CENTRAL VALLEY: THE BOTTOM LINE FOR AGRICULTURE AND TAXPAYERS (1995). 
45. Thompson, supra note 30.
46. Telephone interview with Bob Wilkinson, Lecturer, Environmental Studies
Department, University of California at Santa Barbara (June 6, 1996). 
47. Beginning in 1979, the California Legislature enacted a series of statutes
designed to promote the voluntary transfer of water on a broader regional and 
statewide basis. Such efforts, along with the creation of the 1991 and 1992 Drought 
Water Bank, reflect the view that voluntary water transfers can help re-allocate 
available supplies to the benefit of all Californians. See supra note 17 for additional 
details. 
48. The Model Act also reflects the recognition that water transfers have yet to
achieve their market potential to improve the effectiveness of California's water 
system. It ignores the importance of water for social, environmental, and cultural 
values. It also fails to acknowledge that water transfers, of all classifications and 
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While the Model Act addresses some of the issues raised in Part II, 
supra, and makes incremental progress toward establishing a market in a 
number of very important areas—including efforts to create a set of 
coherent transfer rules, to protect the rights of current water rights holders, 
and to reduce the regulatory burden of water transfer review procedures—it 
flounders in its attempts to provide adequate protections for communities 
and third parties. 
Language in the purpose and policies sections of the Model Act 
proposes a "comprehensive set of laws to govern voluntary transfers of 
surface water and to protect the legitimate interests of others who may be affected 
by such transfers."49 In the Declaration of Policies, for example, the Model 
Act states that "[t]o the extent that water transfers cause injury to. . .the 
regional economies of areas from which water is transferred, these third-
party interests must be appropriately protected or compensated."50 While 
language in these sections acknowledges that community impacts are 
legitimate interests that must be adequately protected or compensated and 
seems to imply that they are adequately protected or mitigated, there is 
little evidence to support this implication in the body of the Model Act. 
Further, nowhere does the Model Act address the fundamental ethical 
question concerning whether water developed by the public, through taxpayer 
investment and for public benefit, should be marketed for private gain. 
This section focuses on the need for more comprehensive community 
and third party protections, and limits the discussion of other Model Act 
issues accordingly. As the National Research Council concluded in Water 
Transfers in the West: Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment: 
[R]ecognition and protection of third party interests are
essential if water transfers are to achieve their potential to
reallocate water to meet new demands. . . . [T]he West has
never treated water as just another commodity and should
not do so now. There must be a balance between efficiency
and fairness.51
durations, produce winners and losers. And, as Ingram has noted, those individuals 
whose interests are quashed by markets are "bound to pursue political avenues to 
achieve benefits and avoid costs." Helen M. Ingram, Politics, Markets, Society, and Water 
Resources, 14 HALCYON: J. HUMAN 57 (1992). Therefore, understanding California's 
needs and changing water politics is the only way to move market discussions 
forward. 
49. See A MODEL WATER TRANSFER ACT FOR CALIFORNIA [hereinafter MODEL ACT]
section 102 (emphasis added), reprinted in 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 3 (1996). 
50. See id. section 101.
51. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 8 (1992). This report highlighted the seriousness of community and 
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The Model Act, as currently written, fails to strike such a balance. 
Community and third-party protections vary depending upon the class of 
water being transferred or upon the duration of the transfer, and all 
protections or mitigations are grossly inadequate. Short-term water 
transfers require no community or third-party impact protection or 
compensation. Protection or compensation for long-term water transfers, 
which may be permanent in nature, are also inadequate.52 Only long-term 
transfers involving water from land fallowing or in retirement qualify for 
community and third-party protection or mitigation consideration.53 
Expedited transfers of conserved water, as defined by Section 505, limit 
review and comment, as well as limiting potential remedies for community 
and third-party impacts to the "security deposit" of $5 per acre-foot of 
water transferred.54 
A. Short-Term Water Transfers Require No Community or Third-
Party Protections
Under current water law, short-term water transfers are transfers of 
water which are one year or less in duration. The Model Act, however, would 
expand the term of short-term transfers to two years or less for transfers 
between the same seller and buyer. The Model Act allows successive two-
year transfers to different buyers.55 Thus, a seller could conceivably enter 
into two-year, consecutive agreements with different buyers and evade ever 
having to safeguard against, or compensate the community or other third 
parties for, reasonable impacts. 
third-party impacts that might result from transfers of irrigation water from local 
areas. The report stated that "[n]o issue gave the committee more trouble than that 
question of how to characterize and evaluate the effects of water transfers on small 
communities." Id. at 45. 
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See MODEL ACT; infra Part III.B.
54. See MODEL ACT. The "security deposit" must be adjusted annually by the
SWRCB based on changes in the Consumer Price Index published by the US 
Department of Commerce. The liability of both buyers and sellers is limited to this 
"security deposit," and the burden of proof is on the injured party who must establish 
by a preponderance of evidence that the claimant's injuries were caused by the water 
transfer and not other factors. See id. section 506(d). 
55. See id. section 204 ("If a water right holder or water transferor enters into
successive short-term agreements with the same party...and if such successive 
agreements with the same party...and if such successive agreements have 
commencement dates within one year of each other and result in the transfer of 
water for a term in excess of two years, the agreement shall be regarded as a long-
term agreement..."). 
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Thus, in an effort to create the right economic and regulatory 
incentives to facilitate market-based water reallocation and improve 
economic efficiency, the Model Act has created a serious loophole for willing 
sellers to sell their water irrespective of the adverse community or third 
party impacts. According to section 404(a), the State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB) must approve the transfer unless it concludes that it 
"would result in significant injury to any legal user of water" or "would 
unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses."56 
As section 404(a) is currently written, only other water rights holders 
and the environment have standing to challenge short-term transfers. The 
burden of proof rests on the parties that have filed protests in accordance 
with section 403.57 Short-term transfers that meet section 404(a) 
requirements, including consecutive transfer as long as it is not to the same 
buyer, must be approved regardless of the adverse economic or social 
impact on community or other third-parties. Such short-term transfers could 
be based on land fallowing or in retirement, or be consecutive, yet not 
require any protection or compensation of community or third-party 
impacts. No challenge, regardless of the seriousness of the economic 
impact, could be filed by the community or others adversely affected. 
B. Long-Term Water Transfers Require Community or
Third-Party Protections Only if Based on Land Fallowing or
Retirement
Similarly, protections or mitigation requirements for long-term 
transfers are grossly inadequate despite the fact that they have a greater 
potential to cause irreparable harm to the community or to third-parties. 
The Model Act defines long-term water transfers as proposals or agreements 
to transfer water for more than two years and includes the permanent 
changes in water rights and permanent transfers of water.58 The Model Act 
would prohibit the SWRCB from approving a long-term transfer unless it 
concluded that the transfer "would not result in significant injury to any 
legal user of water" and "would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other 
instream beneficial uses." 59 Once the SWRCB concluded that the long-term 
transfer complied with these requirements, and that it was not based on 
water from land fallowing or in retirement, it is required to approve the 
transfer, regardless of the impacts on the community or other third parties. 
Thus, like short-term transfers, this category of long-term transfers does not 
require any community or third-party protection or mitigation. 
56. See id. section 404 (emphasis added).
57. See id. section 404(a).
58. See id. section 204.
59. See id. section 404 (emphasis added).
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Community or third-party protection or compensation is required only 
for long-term agreements based on land fallowing or in retirement of 
previously irrigated land that "cause substantial harm to the economy in the area 
from which the water is to be transferred."60 It is unclear from the Model Act what 
level of economic and third-party impacts would be sufficient to constitute 
"substantial harm to the economy." Further, the SWRCB is required to take 
into consideration any actions that the petitioner or other parties to the 
transfer agreement have taken to mitigate harm to the economy. 
Conceivably, then, parties to a long-term transfer of water from land 
fallowing or in retirement that would result in "substantial harm" could 
circumvent their obligation to the community by taking minimal actions to 
mitigate such impacts. Thus, without a clearer definition of "substantial 
harm" and corresponding responsibilities, parties to such transfers could 
easily shed their legal obligations.61 
Evidence suggests that long-term water transfers, especially those 
from land fallowing or in retirement, do create undue economic and social 
burdens on the economies and local governments in the areas from which 
water is transferred. More importantly, impacts are not limited to long-term 
or permanent transfers. Even short-term or emergency transfers have the 
potential to create undue economic burdens. For example, evidence 
suggests that the Drought Water Bank created substantial impacts on the 
local economy, jobs, and social services. In 1992, the Yolo County Board of 
Supervisors submitted a bill for $129,305 to the Department of Water 
Resources for reimbursement of the county's additional expenditures for 
General Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children allegedly 
caused by increased unemployment attributable to land fallowing and to the 
transfer of water to the 1991 Water Bank.62 While the county's claim was not 
substantiated, it illustrates the legitimate concerns held by local 
communities and third-parties dependent on irrigated agriculture for 
their livelihood. 
Evidence from other long-term transfers, even those not involving 
substantial land fallowing or retirement, suggests that impacts may be 
substantial. A study of the Palo Verde Irrigation District—Metropolitan 
Water District two-year transfer suggests that, while it is difficult to quantify 
impacts with a high degree of certainty, there were a number of community 
impacts.63 The study reveals that farm workers were adversely affected 
60. See id. section 404(c) (emphasis added).
61. See id. This provision does not apply to land within the San Joaquin Valley
Drainage Program study area. 
62. See e.g., Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community: Lessons from California's
Drought Water Bank, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 17 (1994). 
63. See LOH & STEDING, supra note 5.
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through the loss of on-farm jobs. The selling community experienced 
negative effects from the loss of employment in farm-related industries.64 
Even non-market transfers or water delivery cutbacks have the 
potential for substantial impacts on local economies and on people that 
depend on water for their livelihoods. A study of the impacts of the water 
delivery cutbacks during the 1987-1992 drought on Mendota (Fresno 
County), for example, concluded that: 
• irrigated cropland decreased by 14 percent as a result;
• farmers substituted groundwater because of the loss of surface
water deliveries and may have exacerbated groundwater
overdraft;
• employment and wages, as well as the number of farms, declined
substantially in the Mendota area;
• non-agricultural, related businesses declined substantially; and
• tax revenues and property values, including agricultural land
values, declined.65
Thus, the premise that only long-term transfers of water from land 
fallowing or retirement can result in substantial impacts on communities 
and other third-parties is not supported by the evidence. As we have 
illustrated above, transfers of water, whether short-term or long-term, 
market-based or the result of drought conditions or legal mandates, can 
have substantial impacts on communities and third parties. Given this 
evidence, the standards and procedures for expedited transfers of conserved 
water are very troublesome. 
C. Expedited Transfers: Inadequate Safeguards and Remedies
The Model Act's expedited transfer provisions purport to provide 
adequate community and third-party protections by limiting the amount of 
water that can be transferred to the transferor's historic consumptive use 
plus any water that is irretrievably lost to all beneficial uses. However, we 
strongly disagree. These limitations may provide some protections for other 
water rights holders, instream uses, and groundwater recharge, but they fail 
to protect the interests of communities or other third-parties which are 
likely to be adversely affected. Not only are protections inadequate as the 
Model Act is currently written, but a community's (or a third-party's) ability 
to challenge an expedited transfer is seriously limited. As the author of the 
Model Act has stated, one of the central purposes of the Model Act is to 
64. Id. at 13-17.
65. See DON VILLAREIO, 93640 AT RISK: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND TOWNSPEOPLE IN AN
ERA OF WATER UNCERTAINTY (1996). 
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"permit. . .transfers to occur relatively quickly and inexpensively without 
substantive pre-transfer review by the State Water Resources Board and 
without post hoc substantive review by the courts."66 
In addition to inadequate public and judicial review, section 505 and 
506 limit the amount of damages to the $5 "security deposit" per acre-foot. 
Section 505 of the Model Act requires that a $5 "security deposit" per acre-
foot of conserved water transferred be placed in a community and third-
party environmental compensation and mitigation fund managed by the 
SWRCB.67 Revenue from the compensation and mitigation fund would be 
used to pay for damages caused to the environment, other water rights 
holders, and to the community. Compensable community injuries are 
limited to the loss of tax revenues and to the increased social services costs. 
Damages to farm workers, to businesses that depend on the current uses of 
water, and to others would not be compensable. Limiting compensable 
damages to local governments is inadequate given the number of other 
third-parties that can be reasonably expected to be adversely impacted by 
water transfers—farm workers, businesses, land owners, among others. 
Others have expressed similar views, and have suggested other 
mechanisms for endowing the compensation fund and for its use.68 The 
Natural Heritage Institute, for example, favors the creation of an impact 
compensation fund that would recapture the excess profits when and where 
they accrue in water transfers.69 The Rural Water Impact Network (R-WIN) 
has recognized the practical limitation in attempting to recapture the excess 
profits and is advancing a community mitigation proposal that calls for a 
tiered water transfer fee schedule based on the type of water and the nature 
of the transfer.70 While R-WIN's proposal is still evolving, it would exempt 
the transfer of water conserved through efficiency, through banking of water 
in wet years in excess of contract, and through small-scale intra-regional 
agriculture to agricultural transfers. The transfer of water conserved through 
rational fallowing, field crops, row crops, and permanent crops would e 
subject to increasing fees, with fees for long-term transfer (those greater 
66. Gray, supra note 62, at 34.
67. MODEL ACT, sections 505, 506.
68. See Gregory A. Thomas & Tara L. Mueller, Reflections of the "Model Water
Transfer Act" by the Natural Heritage Institute, 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 91 (1996). 
69. Id. NHI defines excessive profits as the difference between the cost of
water (including the cost of conserving or salvaging it) to the seller and the price (net 
of less the transaction costs) necessary to motivate the transfer. NHI then would use 
the value of that same block of water in other applications as the proxy to determine 
the price necessary to motivate the transfer. Id. While such an approach seems 
theoretically sound, it might prove difficult in practice. 
70. RURAL WATER IMPACT NETWORK, A PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING IMPACTS FROM
WATER TRANSFERS AND REALLOCATIONS IN CALIFORNIA'S AGRICULTURAL REGIONS (1996). 
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than one year) twice as high as those for short-term transfers.71 While such a 
tiered fee structure might discourage some marginally beneficial transfers, it 
attempts to more accurately correspond to the community and third-party 
economic impacts of communities that lose the water. This structure is 
supported by preliminary findings of the Pacific Institute. 
IV. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Efforts to create a market for water must balance the historically 
competing commodity and community perspectives on water and build 
upon a common understanding of the values involved and of the necessity 
of communication and cooperation. The problem with and the conflict in 
recent efforts to create water markets, including the Model Act, is not that 
they acknowledge that water has "economic" value, but that they attempt to 
divorce water from its value to the community. As F. Lee Brown has noted, 
"Water has value to traditional societies . . . even if it is not scarce. . . . The 
assessment that water has become an economic good. . .does not logically 
or empirically imply that prices and markets are necessary institutional 
prescriptions for handling the problem of its scarcity."72 
This paper has argued that economic theory and rationale alone is 
insufficient to create a market for water. Water is and has always been a 
shared community resource, vital to fulfilling both individual and public 
values. A free market, as envisioned by the Model Act, is not the appropriate 
model for water allocation because it limits public debate in water policy 
and excludes the values of community security, equity, and sustainability. 
As stated previously, community values and equity and fairness are not 
mere barriers to markets, but are among the ends that allocation 
institutions should help achieve. 
The Model Act fails to integrate community and social values with the 
efficiency goals of a market. While it would give current water rights holders 
incentives to sell their water to the highest bidder, and, we would argue, give 
them a windfall, it is unclear how that alone would result in improved water 
reliability and sustainability. We have argued elsewhere that the Model Act 
might actually limit the ability of the SWRCB and other regulatory agencies 
charged with protecting the public interest to uphold and more strictly 
enforce the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use doctrines.73 
71. Id.
72. F. Lee Brown, Water Markets and Traditional Water Values: Merging
Commodity and Community Perspectives 5 (unpublished manuscript, presented at 
the conference "Water: A Trigger for Conflict/A Reason for Cooperation, at the Indiana 
Center for Global Change and World Peace," Indiana University, Mar. 8, 1996). 
73. See LOH & GOMEZ, supra note 1, at 17. The Act would allow conservation and
transfers to establish "reasonable" use in the face of prior unreasonable use by the 
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Similarly, the Model Act fails to establish clear qualifications for 
buyers and sellers. We have recommended elsewhere that buyers should be 
required to demonstrate that they need the water, that there are no better 
alternatives for supply, and that they are conforming to certain standards of 
efficiency.74 While this places an additional burden on potential buyers, it 
ensures that potable water is not being used to promote wasteful water use 
practices at the expense of sustainable agriculture or of basic human or 
environmental needs. A potential means by which to set these 
requirements, which the Model Act does not include, is through a thorough 
and consistent interpretation of the "reasonable" and "beneficial" use 
doctrines. Conceivably, such limitations would not result in more efficient, 
beneficial, or sustainable use of California's water supplies. Rather, the 
Model Act could simply facilitate the flow of water to those with the greatest 
financial ability to pay for it. 
While we believe that long-term, inter-regional voluntary transfers can 
help support communities and economies, this will not occur without 
changes in existing institutions. For efforts to create a water market to 
succeed, especially in a demographically and geographically diverse state 
like California, they must facilitate greater community participation in water 
policy in general and water transfers in particular. Then, and only then, will 
we move closer to creating a market for transfers that balances and protects 
the interests of existing water rights holders, potential buyers, the 
environment, and communities. 
water rights holder, as was the case in the Imperial Irrigation District--Metropolitan 
Water District transfer. Further, by not requiring that potential buyers of water first 
put all their existing water to beneficial use to the fullest extent possible, nor prevent 
waste, unreasonable use, or unreasonable method of use, there is no guarantee that 
transfers will not exacerbate urban sprawl, groundwater overdraft, and other 
unsustainable water management problems. Id. at 18. 
74. Id.
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